2005 年 5 月和 6 月法國與荷蘭分別公投否決歐洲憲法後，制憲運動和歐洲統合頓時陷入危機，要等到 2007 年 1 月德國接任歐盟輪值主席國，同年 5 月法國總統大選結束後，歐盟 27 國領袖才在 6 月柏林高峰會上達成協議，召開政府間會議，10 月里斯本高峰會通過新約，然後於 12 月正式簽署。 2009 年 10 月 2 日愛爾蘭二次公投通過里斯本條約後，歐盟 27 國已完成里斯本條約的批准程序，僅待愛爾蘭、捷克、波蘭和德國將批准書存放至義大利外交部後，里斯本條約即可在 2010 年 1 月 1 日以後生效。本文首先論述里斯本條約發展的史實，然後要依據自由政府間主義建立分析架構，逐一檢視其中的主要變數，試著評析自由政府間主義的解釋能力。依據作者的分析， 自由政府間主義的確仍能有效解釋歐盟重要條約談判，包括:談判實質上由強國領袖主導，超國家機構領袖影響力有限;國家偏好形成，主要是基於戰略安全考量，政治目的確實大於經濟利益;新約內容以三強利益的妥協為基礎，較傾向維持現狀的會員國獲得了最大的讓步;新約雖然意圖強化歐盟的民主屬性，卻透過強化會員國國會在歐盟決策中的角色，又另立涉外事務專門機關，強化政府間機制，符合自由政府間主義「民主監督」與「政府間機制操控」二元對立的推論。不過，自由政府間主義在第一個階段關於國家偏好形成的過程，應加入政黨競爭和議題性質差異的變項，也就是說談判的核心議題會左右利益團體影響力的消長。此外，在第二階段的談判中，「最大公約數」的概念可能已不適合完整呈現三強最後達成的共識。因為，在里斯本條約協商的過程中，決定三強最後妥協的基礎是彼此在核心利益上的妥協與政治角力，而非機械式的「最大公約數」。透過對三強核心利益的界定，再分析當時各方的政治情勢，應更能有效描述和解釋三強最後妥協的結果。

The European integration as well as the EU Constitution-Building was in an impasse in the aftermath of the negative results of the French and Dutch referenda in mid 2005. It was not until the new German government under the leadership of Angela Merkel assumed the EU presidency in January 2007 and the French elected a new President in May of the same year that EU and its member states began working effectively to find a solution to put an end to this crisis. The Berlin European Council in June 2007 finally adopted the compromise and twenty-seven leaders of the EU member states signed solemnly the Treaty in Lisbon in December 2007. The positive result of Irish referendum on October 2, 2009 has finally lifted the last obstacle to the entry into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. The study of the development of the Treaty of Lisbon seems to reconfirm the value of the liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Instead of the supranational leaders assumed by the neo- functionalism and some institutionalists, the leaders of the member states, particularly those from Germany, France and UK, played leading roles in the whole process. In the formulation of national preferences, the politico- strategic concerns prevailed over the economic interest as the liberal intergovernemntalism supposed. The Treaty reinforced not only the democratic institution in the EU but also its intergovernemtal control following the liberal intergovernmentalist logic. Nonetheless, as the author indicates, it was the political parties rather than any economic groups assumed by the liberal intergovernmentalists that played leading roles in the constitution of national preferences owing to the fact that the institutional reform was the major concerns throughout the development of the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, the formulation process of national preferences at negotiations in the EU depends heavily upon the nature of the core issues in each negotiation. Besides, Moraviscik’s key concept of the lowest common denominator failed to explain accurately the results of the negotiations. The compromise between Member States, and particularly the three big powers in the EU, cannot but be explained without reference to the historical development of the Lisbon Treaty and their domestic context.