Since the United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the U.S arms sales to Taiwan have been a critical issue affecting the Cross-Strait relations for the past 40 years. In order to preserve stability in the Taiwan Strait, maintaining sufficient self-defense capability for Taiwan has been the major goal of the United States. However, the U.S security commitment to Taiwan has long been fluctuating between security interests and democratic reputation. It also depends on the stance of the executive branch and of the Congress. This article starts from the theoretical perspective of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and uses the presidential decision-making mechanism as an analysis unit to discuss the U.S president’s dominant role in the arms sales to Taiwan. Based on the three explanatory variables of the President’s term of office - the leader’s “threat perceptions,” the type of governments in presidential systems, and the executive-legislative relationship, the article examines U.S presidents’ choices on the timing of their consideration to make announcements of arms sales to Taiwan and “notifications to Congress for review.” This article further analyzes the considerations of President George W. Bush’s and President Obama ’s arms sales to Taiwan at different stages.

 

Hopefully this paper will provide a better understanding of important factors that influence decision making of arms sales to Taiwan.