由於先天即存在應然與實然的落差,加上後天多元研究取向所導致立論之分歧,使得半總統制常有評價之爭議。因此,論者在研究中除了應正確認識半總統制的理論內涵,亦需謹慎進行案例的比較或應用,始能產生更精確、細緻的研究成果。本文出於這樣的關懷,將從理論層面出發,透過相關文獻檢閱與不同研究方法之回顧,重新發現半總統制的分析焦點及不同運作類型之內涵及變遷方向。再者,本文也將進行半總統制案例的初步檢驗,以確認半總統制國家實際運作的不同樣態與其中原因。
Since Maurice Duverger proposed the concept of semi-presidentialism in 1980, disputes have increasingly been raised among researchers. Given the gap between norms and operations of semi-presidentialism, as well as the complexities among the relationships of president, prime minister, and congress in the operations of semi-presidential countries, this paper develops a theory-driven comparative framework of this concept. Through re- examining the definitions of semi-presidentialism and the methodology of analyzing its operational types, this paper also discovers the intention and trend among them and explores the independent variables of semi- presidentialism operations to explain the operational types and their transitions. By classifying semi-presidential countries according to their patterns of operational types, this paper not only provides researchers with a more effective model to explain or predict semi-presidentialism operations in different countries, but also assists in solving constitutional problems more effectively.
半總統制的設計,通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下,由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施,國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量,則在文獻上甚少探討,也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國,並從較傳統的制度面切入,來探究兩國在制度設計安排上,賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排,主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..
The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..
作為德國歷史上的第一個民主政體─威瑪共和從誕生開始就是一個「生病的民主」,也是一個「沒有民主人的民主」。威瑪憲法的制定者除了架構起所謂的「程序性民主」之外,同時更在議會制的基礎上賦予民選的總統強大的權力─半總統制,加上欠缺民主文化,以及存在著反體制的政黨,致令威瑪憲法像是特洛伊木馬。最後在議會政治失敗的亂局中,希特勒(Adolf Hitler)率領納粹黨徒從木馬中一躍而出,用原本是保護民主的權力將民主政體合法地謀殺掉。 二戰後的聯邦德國..
As the first democracy in German history, the Weimar Republic was “a sick democracy”, and “a democracy without democrats” ever since it was born. The composers of the Weimar Constitution not only constructed a so-called “procedural democracy”, but also gave the extreme power to the people-elected president – semi-presidentialism – based on the foundation of parliamentary system. Furthermore, accompanied with a political climate that lacked democratic culture and existing parties..
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