東協各國政府廣泛地認為,南海爭端是冷戰後東南亞主要的「衝突引爆點」。它也對東協的團結及其有關和平解決爭端的規範帶來了嚴峻的考驗。由於並非所有東協成員國都是南海島礁的聲索國,因此,東協對南海的共識與立場始終受到各國在南海不同利益的影響而罕有「一致性」,而東協決策的模式也顯示其南海政策立場的結構性問題。對南海衝突管理與海域劃界涉及的東協會員國至少有越南、菲律賓、馬來西亞與汶萊,印尼和新加坡的立場也值得關注。本文目的是探討作為一個整體的東協,如何回應南海緊張局勢的升高。雖然東協「共識」(consensus)的程度似乎在制定《東協憲章》 (ASEAN Charter)已經有所進步,但共識仍受到現實政治的限制。本文主要討論「南海各方行為宣言」(Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, DOC)和「南海行為準則」(Code of Conduct on the South China Sea, COC)的發展進程,以及東協對於菲律賓提出「和平、自由、友誼與合作區」(Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship, and Cooperation, ZOPFFC) 的回應。
The South China Sea(SCS)dispute was widely viewed by ASEAN governments as the major ‘flashpoint of conflict’ in the post-Cold War Southeast Asia. It also posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and of its norms concerning peaceful settlements of disputes. Because not all ASEAN member countries are the claim countries of the SCS islands and reefs, therefore, the consensus and position of ASEAN on the SCS have always been rare "consistency" due to different interests in the SCS. ASEAN decision-making style also shows structural problems of its policy stance in the SCS. ASEAN members on conflict management in the SCS and the maritime delimitation involve at least Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei; Indonesia and Singapore’s positions are also noteworthy. The purpose of this paper is to explore how ASEAN as a whole responds to the rise of tensions in the SCS. Although the extent of the ASEAN consensus seems to make progress in the development of the ASEAN Charter, consensus is still subject to the limitations of political realities. This article focuses on the developmental process of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea(DOC)and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea(COC), and the ASEAN responses to the Philippines’ zone of peace, Freedom, friendship and cooperation(ZOPFFC)initiative.
美國如何操作外交政策訊號而使其政策意圖能夠被正確解讀呢?過去研究探討美國外交政策是否因「聽眾成本」大小而變得可信。但對於美國政府如何操作外交政策訊號卻未有系統性研究。本文介紹過去學界引用賽局理論所推演出的兩項假設。即在高賭注系列事件上,美國外交政策訊號呈現正反夾雜,混淆不一的現象。而在低賭注系列事件,美國政策訊號則呈現重複敘述,單調一致的現象。本文以美國在南海島礁爭議,以及其在 APEC 承諾的系列事件為例,試圖檢證上述兩項假設。本文發現就此兩系列案例,美國..
How does the U.S. manage its foreign policy signals to ensure its intentions are read correctly? Scholars have invoked the concept of ‘audience cost’ to explain credibility of leaders’ threats and policy signals. However, no systematic study has been undertaken on how the U.S. government manages its foreign policy signals. By employing two hypotheses developed by a scholar of signaling games, this paper attempts to examine how the U.S. manipulates policy signals to allow its intentions to be read correctly. ..
東南亞國家協會(東協)於 2009 年成立東協政府間人權委員會,一反其 40 年來對聯合國倡議成立區域人權機制之漠視。究竟東協為何成立區域人權機構?現有的文獻已從理性論和觀念論兩種研究途徑探討過,但其解釋 力各有不足。本文仍從理性論的觀點出發,但不同於文獻所強調的東協集體理性,本文強調個別會員國的理性,因為以往文獻在分析層次的選擇上採取了較宏觀的視角,但結果卻是無法完全解釋東權會的成立。本文仍採用理性論的研究途徑,但補充以較微觀的視角,主張東協成立東權會是東..
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)was created in 2009 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), a move contrary to its ignoring of the United Nations’ forty-year advocacy. Why did ASEAN member states create the AICHR? A review of the literature found two types of arguments: rationalist and ideationalist, but neither of them is satisfactory enough to explain why the AICHR was created. This article adopts a rationalist perspective with the emphasis on ASEAN member states’ indi..
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