半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..

本文主要在探討泰國金融改革過程中，國內主要行為者之間的制度性關係。受到 1997 年金融風暴的影響，民主黨(Democrat Party)的乃川 (Chuan Leekpai)政府接受國際貨幣基金(International Monetary Fund, IMF)的建議與援助，從國家長期發展的角度出發，採取了相關的結構性改革政策。但是，2001 年上台的塔克辛(Thaksin Shinawatra)政府卻採取凱恩斯主義為主的民粹政策，希望可以在短期內達到金融..

This paper explores the domestic institutional arrangements and relationships among key political and financial actors in the process of Thailand’s financial reform. Affected by the Asian 1997 financial crisis, the Chuan government adopted structural reform policies which were suggested by the IMF as a long-term solution. However, the Thaksin government which took office in 2001 adopted Keynesian and populist policies to stimulate economic growth and financial stability which focused on short term results. Whose policie..