日本首相握有解散眾議院的權力，眾議院解散後必然伴隨著眾議院的改選，而眾議院的多數勢力得以組閣執政，掌握國家龐大的政治資源。取得政權是政黨的最優先戰略目標，因此首相會選擇有利的時機解散眾議院。 以往的研究指出，首相解散眾議院通常有先決條與最佳時機。但是，安倍首相於 2014 年 11 月宣布解散眾議院的狀況，不同以往，甚至安倍首相自身提出的以暫緩提升消費稅為解散的理由，對選民而言亦欠缺說服力。既然如此，安倍首相為何還是宣布解散眾議院?本文..

The Japanese prime minister is empowered to dissolve the House of Representatives, which sets a stage for a general election that enables the parliamentary majority to form a new cabinet. The prime minister will choose a favorable opportunity to dissolve the House of Representatives in order to retain the regime. Previous studies have indicated that there are certain conditions and optimal timing for the prime minister to disband the House of Representatives. However, the dissolution announced by Prime Minister Abe..

半總統制的設計，通常有一民選的總統及民選產生的國會;在此體制下，由於總統與國會雙元選舉的實施，國會理論上比一般單元選舉的內閣制 要有更強的監督制衡力量。但這種體制下的國會是否具備優於內閣制的監督能量，則在文獻上甚少探討，也成為本研究的最初動機。本文試著比較兩個半總統制的國家-臺灣與法國，並從較傳統的制度面切入，來探究兩國在制度設計安排上，賦予國會的監督潛能為何。這裡的制度設計安排，主要包括憲法及相關法規中賦予國會、委員會及個別議員的權力和資源配備;以及目前國..

The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically inte..