近年來，隨著歐盟和北約組織的東擴與俄國的再度興起，位處西方民主國家與俄國之間「地緣斷層線」上的中東歐國家對俄國「抗衡或扈從」 的議題又再度浮上檯面。相關文獻指出，中、小國家與大國之間的利益相似程度，是決定其對該大國選擇「抗衡或扈從」關係的關鍵前提條件，據此，本文探討在這個「地緣斷層線」上16個曾具有相似背景的前「東方集團」的中東歐國家與俄國之間在外交政策利益相似程度上的變化。以近年來在各國所發生的事件為基礎，本文發現，經濟危機和民主退化的問題， 在近年來開始威脅著這些中東歐國家的傳統政黨，在許多國家中，經濟危機除了使民主的憲政秩序遲遲無法真正地得到鞏固之外，也使得反體制的政黨或政治強人們在對傳統政治失去信心的民眾之中得到一定的支持度，這些反體制的政黨或政治強人們上台之後，因為兩個主要原因，進而影響該國與西方民主國家和俄國之間的關係。第一，這些國家也許並不直接親近俄國，但因為國內政治的原因或是民主退化的問題而與歐盟不睦，遂在外交政策的利益相似程度上逐漸遠離歐盟、接近俄國，例如波蘭的例子; 第二，有些同樣因為國內政治的原因或是民主退化的問題而與歐盟不睦的國家，由於與歐盟發生衝突，而轉為加強與俄國的合作，也會在外交政策的利益相似程度上出現逐漸遠離歐盟、接近俄國的情形，例如匈牙利和捷克。在這兩個系統性的因果機制之下，本文預期，這些國家在經濟能力愈好、民主程度愈高的時候，他們與俄國之間的利益相似程度的差異將會愈大，與西方民主國家之間的關係愈好;反之，當他們的經濟出現問題且民主開始倒退的時候，他們與俄國之間的利益相似程度的差異將會逐漸縮小，逐漸轉向俄國的那一邊。來自16個前「東方集團」的中東歐國家從 2000~2018年的資料支持了本文的論點。本文的發現也顯示，「民主」和 「威權」兩個陣營之間的對抗在冷戰結束近30年之後的今天還沒有緩解，福山在1989時所說的「民主政治和自由市場獲得勝利」的歷史仍然沒有終結。

 

Due to the eastern expansion of EU and NATO and the resurgence of Russia under Putin’s leadership, how the Central and Eastern European fault line states chose between balancing and bandwagoning toward Russia has become a salient issue in contemporary international relations studies. This article investigates changes in the degree of policy similarity between 16 former “Eastern Bloc” Central and Eastern European States and Russia. The rationale for this study is that previous studies demonstrated that this issue is the key to states’ foreign policy formation that determines their balancing- bandwagoning choices. Based on events in recent years, I find that “economic recessions” and “the decay of democracy” are threatening the traditional party politics in these countries. Periods of economic recession make people suspicious of their democratic regime and cause the rise of antiregime parties or political strongmen. These anti-regime parties and political strongmen have gradually won more and more of the support from their people. Once the anti-regime parties or political strongmen are in power, they tend to have disharmonies with EU due to the reasons of their domestic politics or the decay of democracy. Thus, there are two systemic mechanisms to explain these countries’ interest similarity with Russia. First, some of these countries do not seek for Russia’s support after they have disharmonies with EU, then their foreign policy similarities with EU will decrease and thus become closer to Russia indirectly, given the fact that EU and Russia disagree with most of their foreign policy issues. Second, others will seek for Russia’s support after they have disharmonies with EU, then their foreign policy similarities with Russia will increase directly and thus become farther away from EU. Consequently, I expect that foreign policy interest similarity between the 16 Central and Eastern European States and Russia will increase with the decrease of these states’ degree of economic development and democracy. Empirical evidence from all the 16 states between 2000 and 2018 supports my argument. These findings also imply that the confrontation between democracies and autocracies has not gone to its end. We still have not seen “the end of history” as Francis Fukuyama claimed in 1989.