在議會內閣制下,聯合政府內部的跨黨派委任關係帶來了代理問題,而許多學者也同意,政治制度是解決此一代理問題的重要關鍵。簡單的說,參與聯合政府的政黨 ,有充分的理由藉由不同的管理或者監督機制來避免可能的代理損失。本文首先針對聯合政府下代理問題的成因進行簡短討論,再透過相關的文獻回顧,檢視在共同治理的過程中,有哪些不同的制度可以被聯合政府內的政黨用來約束以及監督其執政夥伴的投機行為,以及這些制度的成效。最後,本文也針對此一文獻未來可能的發展方向,提出簡單的幾個建議。
While delegating policymaking power across party lines can create the principal-agent problem in multiparty governments, scholars widely acknowledge that political institutions are crucial in mitigating this issue. To avoid potential agency loss, parties in multiparty governments may employ various control mechanisms to keep tabs on their ruling partners. This paper begins by briefly discussing the causes of the delegation problem in multiparty governments. We then provide a systematic review of the current literature to demonstrate the ins..
本研究以為,兩岸關係的核心議題即為經濟合作擴溢到政治協議的爭 論,原因在於其涉及政黨認同、族群意識、國家認同、臺海安全,以及經濟 發展等各種複雜因素。鑑於經濟合作為當前臺灣兩岸關係進程的關鍵議題, 本研究以「新自由制度主義」(neo-liberal institutionalism)作為研究架構,分 析在 2010 年簽訂「海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議」(Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ECFA)之後,臺灣民眾..
As far as cross-Strait relations are concerned, the core issue could be the argument about the spillover effects from economic cooperation toward political negotiations, because it closely relates to party identification, ethnic consciousness, national identity, cross-Strait security, and economic development. In light of the critical agenda of cross-Strait economic cooperation, this study employs neo-liberal institutionalism as the theoretical framework, and examines the impact of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement..
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