法國與臺灣的政府體制都屬於半總統制,法國的憲政經驗中曾出現過三次的「左右共治」,臺灣的憲政經驗中卻從未出現過「藍綠共治」,何以如此?這是本文欲探討的課題。本文藉助賽局理論作為分析工具,探討制度安排如何影響行動者間的策略互動,以致最後產生了共治與否的差異。法國與臺灣擁有不同的選舉制度和不同的國會保障機制,在兩種制度因素的交互作用下,會引導分屬不同政黨陣營的總統和國會多數產生不同的政治計算與策略互動,最終導致法國出現「左右共治」,臺灣卻沒有出現「藍綠共治」。
Both France and Taiwan’s political systems are semi-presidential. However, “cohabitation” in French constitutional experience has occurred three times while Taiwan has never seen “cohabitation” until now. Finding the reason for this difference is the central question of this paper. By using the game theory as an analysis tool, the paper explores how the institutional design influences the actors’ strategic interactions, which underlies the discrepancy between France and Taiwan in “cohabitation”. France and Taiwan have different electoral systems and different safeguard clauses of the congressional term. Therefore, differences in political calculations and strategic interactions are the two institutional factors that result in the president and the parliamentary majority belonging to different party coalitions, and which lead to the fact that France has seen “cohabitation” while Taiwan has not.
現今半總統制國家數目已經正式超越純粹總統制與內閣制,成為當今最多國家採用的政體類型。近來部分研究關注於半總統制國家的演化發展,除探討半總統制國家朝向內閣制傾斜的演化趨勢外,半總統制國家朝向「總統化」(presidentialisation)發展現象也成為學界關心的新研究焦點。本研究嘗試從半總統制國家朝向總統化發展的角度,探討總統化的定義內涵與演化動力、總統化對於政黨體系的影響,特別著重於總統化對於內閣性質以及內閣穩定度(stability of cabine..
The semi-presidential system has become the most popular regime type in the world, indicated by the number of states that adopted the system having surpassed that of purely presidential system and the parliamentary system since 2000. A number of major studies have recently focused on the evolution of semi-presidentialism; some of the researches have sketched the working mode of parlimentalization of semi-presidential system, and considerable studies have been paying attentions to the development of a semi-presidential system ..
本文探討半總統制下的立法課責,以臺灣與法國為個案進行比較研究。「立法課責」指如何讓立法者(集體或個別)的所作所為能為利害關係人知道,而據以獎懲。過去比較臺、法的研究發現,總理總統制的法國,國會的運作型態較偏內閣制;總統議會制的臺灣,運作則較偏總統制,因而在傳統印象上,多會認為法國會較重視以政黨為對象的集體課責,臺灣則可能較偏重以候選人或立委為對象的個別課責。 本文乃透過制度規範上對選舉前與選舉後的資訊公開要求,比較臺灣與法國在集體課責與個別課..
This paper explores the legislative accountability under semi- presidentialism and uses the case study approach to compare Taiwan with France. “Legislative accountability” refers to how the actions of legislators (collectively or individually) can be known to interested parties, and how rewards and punishments can be used accordingly. The literature comparing Taiwan and France in the past found that the parliamentary operation of the French premier-presidential system is most similar to a cabinet system; whereas Taiwan’s p..
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