2013 年 1 月 22 日,菲律賓依據聯合國海洋法公約第 15 部分第 287 條與 附件 7 之規定,片面對中國啟動關於南海海洋管轄權爭端的強制仲裁程序。 在中國聲明拒絕接受及參與此一程序的情況下,仲裁庭在 2015 年 10 月 29 日宣判對本案之管轄權成立,並於同年 11 月完成實質問題階段的開庭審理,預定 2016 年 6 月以前作出判決。菲律賓有計畫地設計對中國九段線及歷史性權利主張的法律戰,試圖瓦解中國的南海主張,對該主張的合法性帶來極大的壓力。本仲裁案對我國作為南海主張之一方的身分,以及太平島的島嶼地位,更帶來雙重的困境。本文建議,仲裁庭在審理《公約》第 121 條 第 3 項解釋以及太平島地位時,應謹慎考量一些菲律賓沒有注意到,但卻相關的問題。有鑒於本仲裁案恐對我國有不利的影響,現階段政府有必要繼續維持我國在太平島的存在,強化我國作為南海主張和利益當事者、的論述,並設法爭取最大的戰略利益。
On January 22 2013, Philippines unilaterally initiated compulsory arbitral procedure against China, in accordance with Part XV, Article 287 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ( UNCLOS ), concerning matters relating to their disputes over maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea. China formally declared its objection against the procedure and refused to participate. Notwithstanding this circumstance, the Arbitral Tribunal established its jurisdiction on October 29 2015, and conducted hearings on merits in November. The award on merits is expected by June 2016. The Philippines has conducted a “lawfare” against China by deliberately formulated its submissions in such ways that the legal bases and validity of China’s Nine-dash Line and historic rights claims may be under serious threat. In addition, the arbitration has not only gravely undermined Taiwan’s identity as a claimant to the South China Sea, but also caused uncertainty to Itu Aba’s status as an “island”. These challenges could have a negative impact on Taiwan. It is suggested that the Tribunal should carefully consider relevant issues concerning the interpretation of Article 121(3)of UNCLOS and the legal status of Itu Aba, which have been omitted by the Philippines. Moreover, Taiwan should make sustained efforts in maintaining presence on the Itu Aba and advocating its identity as a claimant and stakeholder in the South China Sea, and try to maximize its strategic interests.
WTO爭端解決機制一向被譽為皇冠上之珍珠,如今上訴機構陷入停擺危機,反而成為皇冠上之荊棘。過去數年來,美國運用WTO所要求之共識,屢次反對上訴機構成員之選任案,尤其是川普政府上台後更加強杯葛之力道。根據爭端解決規則暨程序瞭解書之規定,上訴案件最少由三名成員審理並作成裁決。然而2019年12月10日之後,上訴機構已無法正常運作。長期以來美國對上訴機構提出許多批評,包括系統性、實質性與程序性問題;反之,許多WTO會員則急於補實懸缺,而疏於處理美國關切之事項。根據爭端解決規則暨程序瞭解書第3...
The dispute settlement system, often considered as the “crown jewel” of the WTO, is in a present crisis and becomes the crown of thorns. Over the past years, the United States through the use of the WTO’s consensus requirements has successfully blocked the launch of a process to select the Appellate Body members. This is carried forward by the Trump administration. With a Settlement of Disputes Understanding (DSU) requirement that appeals be heard by three AB members, with the AB membership down to zero at the present time..
能源憲章條約於1998年生效,目前有54個簽署方,大部分位於歐洲與中亞地區。其目的為保障外國投資人免受地主國不當之管制或政治干預,包括訴諸投資人與地主國爭端解決機制之途徑。2018年啟動該條約之現代化談判,歷經約五年談判後,2022年6月24日能源憲章大會通過原則性協議,完成ECT之修正內容。雖然談判結果未將化石燃料投資排除於保障範圍之外,不過該條約現代化所帶來之實質性改變仍有所進展。儘管如此,部分歐盟會員國宣布退出能源憲章條約,歐盟執委會亦隨之展開協調歐盟及其會員國退出該條約。根據該條..
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) came into force in 1998 and is currently signed by 54 countries, mostly in Europe and Central Asia. Its purpose is to protect foreign investments from regulatory or political interferences of host State, including through investor-State dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS). A negotiation to modernize the agreement was launched in 2018. On 24 June 2022, after five years of negotiations, the Energy Charter Conference Member States reached an Agreement in Principle regarding revisions to the ECT. Despite a crushin..
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