本文主要是補充論述日本新選舉制度與自民黨走向集權化的關係。既有研究指出，在新選舉制度下，日本自民黨的派閥勢力逐漸地瓦解，從政治過程的觀察中，同時顯示出自民黨派閥的影響力確實也在消退中。本文發現，自民黨在新選舉制度下，依然維持「現任者優先」的提名策略，而「現任者優先」卻具有默認既存派閥勢力的意味。就此而言，派閥勢力應該保有足夠的生存空間，又為何會在新選舉制度下逐漸消退呢 ? 本文擬從候選人在新選舉制度下的「趨中現象」、「政權公約」的黨中央主導、重複提名的設計與比例的提高，以及 「七十三歲屆齡退休」等面向，提出補充的論述，說明為何新選舉制度會造成自民黨中央權力的強化。

The main purpose of this paper is to further elaborate on the relationship between Japan's new electoral system and augmentation of power in the LDP central committee.

The existing studies pointed out that the newly-reformed electoral system in Japan leads to a gradual decline of factions within the LDP while the actual power of the LDP central committee was elevated. However, this paper argues that if LDP's nomination process in the new electoral system still complies with the principle of “incumbents first," which would suggest acquiescence in the factions' existing power, why do the factions decline gradually? Based on various aspects, namely, candidates' centripetal competition under the new electoral system, Manifesto led by the central committee, incremental proportion of candidates' duplicate registration, and enforcement of the ‘73-year-old retirement age', this paper analyzes and elaborates on the reasons of the LDP central committee strengthening its power under the new electoral system.