本文的比較以法國國民議會與我國的立法院為基準，因法國的國會雖有參議院與國民議會兩院，但國民議會無論是議員產生的方式，或是所擁有的權力，都與我國立法院較相似，故以國民議會作為兩國的比較案例。而在比較實際操作規範部分，則以臺灣的第七屆，共 113 位立法委員，與法國的第十三屆，共 577 位國民議會議員，其運作所依據的成文法則為對象。
The so-called semi-presidentialism designs a system that popularly elects both the president and the parliament. Under the dual-election design, the parliament theoretically should own more check and balance power than a parliament that gives rise to the cabinet. However, whether the parliament under semi-presidentialism in practice is indeed equipped with more oversight capacity than that of a cabinet system’s parliament has been rarely studied in prior literature. This paper tries to study this theoretically interesting but literarily lacking topic. It compares the semi-presidential systems in both countries—Taiwan and France—from the traditional perspective of institution, with aims to know to what extent have their institutional designs vested the oversight powers unto their parliaments respectively. The institutional designs mentioned here include constitutional laws or enactments that are relevant with the powers and resources delegated to the parliaments, committees and individual legislators. These also include the written rules currently implemented in the parliaments and committees in both countries.
The comparative study carried out in this research will primarily focus on the French National Assembly and Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. Although the French Pariliament consists of the Senate and the National Assembly, it is still much similar with the Legislative Yuan in that the means for the National Assembly to elect its senators or the power assumed by which bear some resemblances with those in Taiwan. Therefore, the National Assembly will be the cardinal case for this study. As for the implementations of this research, it focuses on the 7th Assembly of Legislators in Taiwan (113 total) and the 13th Assembly of senators (577 total) in France, as well as the conventional laws for researches.
The result of this study shows that as oversight powers of both parliaments are inspected, Taiwan is closer to a presidential system whereas France to a cabinet system. It also shows that the Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan carries far greater oversight powers than France’s National Assembly, which more or less suggests, in terms of check and balance power of parliament, the systematic design of Taiwan prones to the presidential system more in comparision to the cabinet proclinition in France.
This paper aims at exploring how semi-presidentialism differs from presidentialism in affecting electoral performance of three largest parties in honeymoon elections. This paper argues that different levels of power separation in presidentialism and semi-presidentialism explain why the effects of honeymoon elections vary. Many existent studies indicated that in presidential systems, with total power separation, the largest and the third largest parties would gain in honeymoon elections that used proportional electoral systems..
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